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PROTECTING BAsIc RIGHTS OF CITIZENS
by Ellen Catsman Freidin and Ann C. McGinley
Ballot Title: Basic Rights
Ballot Summary: Defines "natural persons," who are equal before the law and who have inalienable rights,
as "female and male alike;" provides that no person shall be deprived of any rights because of national
origin; changes "physical handicap" to "physical disability" as a reason that people are protected from
being deprived of any right.
R evision 9 suggests three important changes
to the basic rights provision of the Florida Con-
stitution. First, it would add "female and male
alike" to define "natural persons who are equal
before the law." This change expressly recognizes equality
of the sexes. Second, it would prohibit the government from
depriving a person of any right because of the person's
national origin. Finally, the revision prohibits the govern-
ment from depriving a person of any right because of
"physical disability," replacing the currently existing pro-
tection for "physical handicap."
The Declaration of Rights Committee recommended
these changes and the CRC overwhelmingly agreed after
studying and debating each separately on its own merits.
The vote on "female and male alike" was 31-5.1 The vote
on "national origin" was 28-0; 2 on "physical disability," the
vote was 29-1.3 The final vote on the entire Revision 9 was
28-7.
4
Basic Rights: History and Interpretation
The basic rights provision begins with an affirmative
grant of equality to all natural persons as well as an illus-
trative enumeration of inalienable rights. The term "natu-
ral" was interposed to clarify that this provision does not
apply to corporations, but only to private persons.5
The last sentence of the basic rights provision currently
states, "No person shall be deprived of any right because
of race, religion or physical handicap." The Florida Su-
preme Court has held unequivocally that this section pro-
tects individual rights from governmental intrusions, not
from intrusions of private parties.6
Like the federal equal protection clause that requires
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strict scrutiny of governmental classifications based on
race or national origin, 7 this sentence in the Florida Con-
stitution imposes a duty on the government to demonstrate
that a classification based on race, religion, or physical
handicap is narrowly tailored to further a compelling state
interest. 8 An amendment of this sentence, therefore, is an
unambiguous vehicle for providing greater protection to
individuals who are members of any newly enumerated
group.
The CRC suggested amending this section to add "na-
tional origin."As will be seen below, however, the CRC chose
a different vehicle to recognize that Florida's women and
men are equal under the Florida Constitution.
Declaration of Rights Committee:
Process and Substance
The CRC conducted 12 public hearings around the state,
and the Declaration of Rights Committee met 11 times
for approximately 32 hours. Both took testimony on a wide
variety of proposals-from legalizing marijuana for medi-
cal purposes to permitting conjugal visits in Florida pris-
ons. All together, the committee considered 29 proposals,
reporting out 12 proposals favorably. Only three of these
proposals, which are now combined in Revision 9, were
approved by the whole CRC.'
"Female and Male Alike"
As the Florida Supreme Court currently interprets the
basic rights provision ofArticle I, §2, classifications based
on race, religion, and physical handicap are subject to strict
scrutiny'0 whereas classifications based on sex appear to
be subject to a lesser intermediate level scrutiny." To with-
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stand a constitutional challenge, a
gender-based 12 classification must be
substantially related to the achieve-
ment of important governmental ob-
jectives.13 Because the Florida Su-
preme Court has already interpreted
the last sentence of Article I, §2 to
require strict scrutiny of enumerated
classifications made on the basis of
race, religion, and physical handicap,
adding "sex" to this section would
almost certainly have raised the level
of scrutiny applied to sex-based clas-
sifications to strict scrutiny. 4 This
change would put sex-based classifi-
cations on a par with race-based clas-
sifications.
The original proposal before the
CRC was to add "sex" to the list of
enumerated protected characteris-
tics, but the CRC accepted an amend-
ment to this proposal that defined
"natural persons" as "female and
male alike." This change was adopted
as a solution to concerns expressed
by some commissioners that adding
"sex" to the last sentence of the basic
rights provision could lead a Florida
court to legalize same sex marriage.
15
Their concern was engendered by a
decision from the Supreme Court of
Hawaii requiring the application of
strict scrutiny to the marriage stat-
ute which limited marriage to a het-
erosexual union. When the lower
court applied strict scrutiny, it held
that the Hawaii marriage statute
was unconstitutional because it dis-
criminated on the basis of sex.' 6
Because the intent was simply to
secure equality for women in the
Florida Constitution, the CRC ac-
cepted the amendment. 7
In debating the proposal, Commis-
sioner Gerald Kogan, the chief jus-
tice of the Florida Supreme Court, ex-
pressed these views:
We have heard from the women, but this
is not solely a women's issue. This is a
statement that this Constitution Revision
Commission can make. And the state-
ment is that once and for all this state
will go on record as saying that there is
no question but that under the law of this
state, men and women are equal. And I
say this on behalf of the men who make
up approximately half of the population
of this state.
And for our spouses, our daughters,
our friends that are women, there is no
hidden agenda here. But the time has fi-
nally come for us to put at rest this issue
Questions have
arisen concerning
the effect and
interpretation of the
"female and male
alike" language in the
basic rights provision.
once and for all. And by saying that men
and women are equal under the law, then
we have made that statement that the
time has finally come for it. And I recom-
mend to all of you to vote in favor of this
proposal.'8
Questions Raised
Questions have arisen concerning
the effect and interpretation of the
"female and male alike" language in
the basic rights provision. Because no
other state constitution contains
similar language, Florida cannot rely
for interpretation solely on other
state decisions. Thus, the commis-
sioners' intent in adopting this lan-
guage and the overall purpose of the
basic rights provision are particu-
larly important in its interpretation.
Strict Scrutiny?
The first question is whether "fe-
male and male alike" requires courts
to apply strict scrutiny to sex-based
classifications. This language has two
possible interpretations: It could sim-
ply clarify that "all natural persons"
includes males and females, or it
could raise sex to a protected class
subject to strict scrutiny.
Commissioners voiced both inter-
pretations in debate. In fact, one com-
missioner refused to support the
amendment because it either did
nothing or did too much. Other com-
missioners assumed that adding "fe-
male and male alike" would subject
gender-based classifications to strict
scrutiny. This reading is more consis-
tent with the intent of the CRC.
Although the change would not
necessarily enhance existing statu-
tory protections of Florida's women, 9
proponents emphasized that the time
had come for the Florida Constitu-
tion to recognize that women are
equal to men. As Commissioner Ellen
Freidin stated:
If women had always been allowed to
vote, had always been allowed to make
decisions for themselves, had always been
allowed to own property, that would be
unnecessary. But under the circum-
stances where women have not had equal
opportunities to employment, women
have not been able to have equal pay,
women initially were considered property
of their husbands or their families, we
have got a long history of oppression of
women. And it's time that there be an
explicit recognition that women are equal
to men.20
It is inexcusable that our Constitution
in 1998 does not mention women. It is
inexcusable that other classes of people
are mentioned in our Constitution with
specific protection and that women, more
than 50 percent of our population, are not
mentioned.
2 1
This interpretation is consistent
with the general purpose of the ba-
sic rights provision and its history.
In a statement before the commis-
sion, Professor Patrick 0. Gudridge
of the University of Miami School of
Law emphasized that the addition of
"female and male alike" would grant
women greater protection than they
currently have under the Florida
Constitution:
Is "women and men alike" redundant lan-
guage given the existing constitutional
declaration that"[a]ll natural persons are
equal before the law"? In answering this
question, it is important to note that in
1968 there was relatively little constitu-
tional case law considering the question
of whether constitutional equality obli-
gations limited legislative or administra-
tive differences in treatment of men and
women. Strictly speaking, therefore, it is
not easy to read the 1968 language, in its
original context, as dealing directly with
"women and men alike." Article I, section
2, as it now stands, marks discrimination
on the basis of religion, race and physi-
cal handicap as constitutionally suspect.
No reference whatsoever to "women and
men alike" may therefore carry (for some
readers) a negative implication-that dif-
ferences in treatment of this sort are not
constitutionally controversial.22
Same-Sex Marriage?
Because of the unique history of
this provision, its proponents' clear
statements of intent, and the experi-
50 THE FLORIDA BAR JOURNAL/OCTOBER 1998
HeinOnline -- 72 Fla. B.J. 50 1998
ence in the vast majority of other ju-
risdictions upholding traditional
marriage statutes, the claim that this
provision will create some new en-
titlement to same-sex marriage is un-
founded.
Florida law requires courts inter-
preting a constitutional provision to
consider the people's will in adopt-
ing the provision.23 In so doing, the
courts will consider historical prece-
dent, present facts, and common
sense.24 Florida courts will also con-
sider explanatory statements or ma-
terials available to the public at the
time of the adoption of the constitu-
tional provision.2 5 Here, the main
proponents of equality for women, in
debate and in written submissions
for the record of the CRC, have made
clear and unambiguous statements
of intent. For example, Commissioner
Freidin stated:
As a sponsor of that proposal, I state un-
equivocally that in offering this proposal
I do not intend and have never intended
for it to form the basis for a right to same-
sex marriage in this state. Furthermore,
I am satisfied that adoption of this pro-
posal by the voters would not confer such
a right.26
An examination of the expressed
intentions of the proponents of this
proposal makes clear that the com-
missioners' intent in offering the "fe-
male and male alike" language is lim-
ited to granting additional
constitutional protection to women in
Florida. This expressed intent is con-
sistent with the overall purpose of
the basic rights provision which is to
grant rights to persons identified in
the provision.
Furthermore, because no other
state constitution or law includes the
language "female and male alike" to
define "natural persons," the pro-
posed language has never been inter-
preted to confer a right to same-sex
marriage.
Most importantly, although over 20
states or territories have equal rights
amendments,27 only the Hawaii court
has held that an equal rights provi-
sion, which bears no resemblance to
the proposed provision here, permits
same-sex marriage. 28 The Hawaii
decision is an aberration.29 Courts in
seven states with equal rights
amendments and/or statutes prohib-
iting discrimination "because of sex"
have consistently held that these pro-
visions did not limit a state's freedom
to forbid same-sex marriage. 30
One of the most recent cases ad-
dressing the constitutionality of a
marriage statute is Baker v. Vermont,
slip op. (Vt. Super., December, 19,
1997) (also available at http://
www.fitzhugh.com/samesex.htm). In
Baker, the superior court upheld the
Vermont marriage statute, conclud-
ing that the marriage statute does
not violate a fundamental right and
does not discriminate on the basis of
gender.
The court stated:
[Slame-sex unions simply fall outside the
definition of marriage, which is premised
on uniting one member of each sex. As a
result an individual's gender is irrelevant
to the application of the marriage stat-
utes.
Vermont's laws do not treat similarly situ-
ated males and females in a different
manner; the statutes apply even-
handedly to both sexes. No benefit is con-
ferred nor burden imposed upon one sex
and not the other. Requiring a member
of each sex to create a marriage does not
favor one sex over the other, and does not
constitute invidious discrimination based
on gender.
There is no reason to believe that
under these circumstances the pro-
posed language would create any new
right to same sex marriage in Florida.
National Origin
Revision 9 also adds "national ori-
gin" as a protected characteristic in
the last sentence of Art. I, §2. If this
proposal passes, the Florida Consti-
tution will explicitly require that
strict scrutiny be applied to govern-
mental classifications based on a
person's national origin.31 "National
origin" includes not only the place of
birth, but also a person's ancestry
and ethnicity. 2 Commissioner
Planas, the sponsor of the proposal,
explained that this provision is par-
ticularly necessary in Florida be-
cause of the state's large number of
immigrants and the continued exist-
ence in Florida of discrimination
THE FLORIDA BAR JOURNAL/OCTOBER 1998 51
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based on national origin.3 This pro-
posal was adopted unanimously by
the commission,3 4 and received vir-
tually no opposition.
This new constitutional provision
is intended to make clear to the
Florida courts, to persons living in
Florida, and to those contemplating
emigrating to Florida that Florida
law will protect the interests of all per-
sons and will not permit any depriva-
tion of rights because of a person's na-
tional origin, ancestry, or ethnicity. This
provision is not, however, intended to
protect illegal immigrants from federal
immigration laws.
3 5
Physical Disability
Revision 9 also changes "physical
handicap" to "physical disability." The
Missing children don't
advertise themselves.
In fact, since the majority
of them are abducted
by a parent, they might
not realize they're
"'missing" at all. That's
what makes our job
tougher, and why we're
asking for your help.
In your professional
capacity, you might be
able to identify an
abducted child, or a
parent who may have
abducted a child. If so,
please contact Child Find
of America. Or ask the
parent to call us for
confidential mediation.
Our toll-free hotline is
1-800-A-WAY-OUT.
intent of this provision is twofold.
First, it updates the term "handicap,"
which is regarded by many as deroga-
tory, replacing it with the currently
acceptable term: "disability."
6
Second, by changing the term to
"disability," this proposal, although
not requiring Florida courts to follow
federal law, offers a body of federal
law that Florida courts can access
when defining "disability."
37
Conclusion
Revision 9 provides Florida voters
the opportunity to make modest but
meaningful changes to one of the
most valued sections of our state's
fundamental document. The Consti-
tution Revision Commission did not
arrive at these recommendations
lightly; rather, they came about only
after rigorous and lengthy debate.
The overwhelming bipartisan sup-
port of the commission and the early
favorable polling results3 8 indicate
that Revision 9 represents what Flo-
ridians want their constitution to
express. Ll
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and FLA. STAT. §§760.10, 760.23, 760.60,
112.66, 175.333, 185.341, 240.364,
420.516, and 641.406 already prohibit
discrimination based on national origin.
FLA. STAT. §760.02(5) specifically defines
"national origin" to include ancestry for
purposes of the Florida Civil Rights Act.
Moreover, the Florida Supreme Court has
held it unconstitutional under Art. I, §2
to exclude jurors solely on the basis of
their ethnicity. See State v. Alen, 616 So.
2d. 452, 454 (Fla. 1993).
33 See Transcript, Commission Debates,
January 12, 1998, pp. 43-47.
34 See CRC, February 25, 1998 (28 yeas,
0 nays), p. 202.
3 See Transcript, Commission Debates,
February 25, 1998, pp. 133-34.
36 See Transcript, Commission Debates,
January 12, 1998, pp. 76-86.
37 See id.
38 The CRC's poll released July 28,1998,
conducted by Public Opinion Strategies
and Frederick Schneider Research, indi-
cated an 81 percent favorable vote on
Revision 9. A Mason Dixon poll, released
July 25, 1998, indicated that 78 percent
would vote "yes" on the revision.
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